We construct a quantitative equilibrium model of the housing market in which an unanticipated increase in the supply of housing triggers default mortgages via its eect on house prices. The decline in house prices creates an incentive to increase the consumption of housing space, but leverage makes it costly for homeowners to sell their homes and buy bigger ones (they must absorb large capital losses). Instead, leveraged households nd it advantageous to default and rent housing space. Since renters demand less housing space than homeowners, foreclosures are a negative force aecting house prices. We explore the possible eects of the government's foreclosure prevention policy in our model. We nd that the policy can temporarily reduce foreclosures and shore up house prices.
Introduction
The goal of this project is to construct a quantitative equilibrium model of the housing market in which a shock to fundamentals triggers default via its eect on house prices. Our analysis is motivated by the recent experience of declining house prices and rising defaults on mortgages in the United States (and elsewhere) and the US government's attempt to stabilize the housing market by instituting a program of loan modications to prevent foreclosures. We use our quantitative model to explore the possible impacts of the foreclosure prevention policy.
The key elements of our model environment are as follows. We imagine a city with an exogenously given but potentially time-varying stock of housing. The city is populated by a continuum of innitely lived residents subject to uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. Residents can buy consumption goods, save in the form of a risk-free savings account with an exogenously given and constant interest rate, and purchase or rent their housing space. If a resident chooses to purchase housing space, he or she can borrow funds from a mortgage market to do so. Residents must pay tax on earnings and interest income. As in the US federal tax code, interest payments on mortgages can be deducted from taxable income and implicit rental income from owner-occupancy is excluded from taxable income.
We model the mortgage market as competitive, with every borrower being charged an interest rate that exactly reects the borrower's objective probability of default. A key determinant of this default risk is the level of down payment made on the loan -a level that we assume is freely chosen by the borrower. The endogeneity of the down payment will imply that when the risk of default is perceived to be low, the down payment chosen will be low as well and homeowners will be highly leveraged.
We locate the proximate cause of the mortgage crisis in overbuilding: an increase in the supply of housing that fails to be matched by an increase in demand at the going price. In equilibrium, the price of housing must fall to absorb the increase in supply. Our model shows how leverage and the tax benets of homeownership can conspire to turn a simple adjustment of demand and supply into a crisis. Leverage implies that when the price of housing falls, selling one's home imposes a capital loss. Instead of selling their homes and buying a bigger one, the capital loss of a sale induces homeowners to give up their homes in foreclosure and rent for a while. But renting does not have the same tax benets as homeownership, so the erstwhile homeowners tend to rent less space than they previously owned. In this fashion, foreclosures and renting become forces contributing to less housing demand, not more. Consequently, foreclosures end up exacerbating the downward adjustment of house prices.
With regard to foreclosure prevention policy, we nd that the policy being pursued by the government can be eective in decreasing foreclosures and thereby shoring up house prices. However, our analysis also reveals that the expiration of the policy may be followed by another crash in housing prices and another spike in foreclosures. The reason is simply that, by delaying foreclosures, the policy delays adjustment to the higher supply of housing. Thus, once the policy expires, the adjustment starts anew and home prices fall again.
Literature Review
There is a rapidly growing literature on the nancial crisis and the mortgage crisis. Much of this literature is empirical. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst quantitative-theoretic investigation of the interaction between the jump in foreclosures (the mortgage crisis) on the one hand and the crash in house prices (the housing crisis) on the other. We are also the rst to analyze the implications of the foreclosure prevention policy on house prices in a fully articulated equilibrium model of the housing and mortgage markets.
We build on a small but growing quantitative-theoretic literature on the housing sector. We have in mind In terms of modeling the mortgage market, we follow Jeske and Krueger (2005) and Guler (2008) in assuming that each loan is competitively priced to reect the objective probability of default on the loan (individualized or risk-based pricing) and in assuming that a borrower controls the objective probability of default by her choice of down payment.
In terms of modeling the housing market, we follow Gervais (2002) and Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009) in conceiving of the housing market as a market for homogeneous housing space, as opposed to houses. This conceptualization is attractive in that there is one housing market price the price per square foot of housing space to be determined each period.
The role of aggregate shocks in a model of mortgage lending and housing has been analyzed in Ríos-Rull and Sánchez-Marcos (2008). Their analysis is explicitly stochastic, and they employ a forecasting equation (for future house prices) of the type developed in Collusi (2006) to get around the high dimensionality of the state vector. In contrast, our analysis is not explicitly stochastic we analyze the impact of an unanticipated shock to housing supply but we work out the perfect foresight equilibrium path following the shock. This approach is congenial for us because we can easily handle the dynamics introduced by the existence of a terminal date for the foreclosure prevention policy.
Environment
We will study the housing equilibrium in a representative city. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
The city has a uctuating stock of housing space H(t) > 0.
People
There is a xed continuum of individuals. Individuals derive utility from the consumption of a homogeneous consumption good and the service ow from housing space. We permit the service ow from owner-occupied housing space to be potentially higher than the service ow from rented housing space. 
We assume that
Note that housing space used by a resident must be either fully owned or fully rented.
Each resident independently draws an earnings level w from a nite-state Markov process with non-negative positive support W ⊂ R + . The probability that w t+1 = w given w t = w is F (w , w).
Market Arrangement
The homogeneous consumption/endowment good is the numeraire good. There are four markets in this economy.
1. There is a market for owner-occupied housing in which the price per unit of housing space in period t is P (t). An individual who buys k units of housing pays a purchase price of P (t) · k . We assume that owner-occupied housing comes in discrete sizes given by the nite set K.
2. Second, there is a market for rental housing in which the rent per unit of housing space in period t is R(t). An individual who rents h units of housing space in period t pays R(t) · h as rent.
3. Third, there is a market for risk-free deposits. The interest rate on deposits is r > 0. An individual who saves a units receives a(1 + r) next period.
4. Finally, there is a market for mortgages where individuals can borrow to fully or partially fund the purchase of a house. For tractability we assume that all mortgages are perpetuities, in the sense that each mortgagee pays some agreed to amount x each period unless the mortgagee defaults or the mortgage is paid o. In the case of default, the nancial intermediary gets ownership of h. In the case where the mortgage is paid o, the lender receives the present value of the promised payment
x discounted at the risk-free rate r. Because of the possibility of default, the (unit) price q of a mortgage depends on the amount of housing pledged as collateral h, the payment amount x promised in perpetuity, the individual's post-purchase savings y, his current earnings w, and the time period t.
An individual who takes out a mortgage in period t with perpetuity payment x receives q(x, h, y, w, t)·x in the current period.
Government Sector
There is also a government sector that levies taxes on income. For simplicity, we assume that government consumption of goods does not have to provide any benets to households. The amount of taxes g to be paid
by an individual is modeled after the US tax code. An individual's tax liability depends on the individual's taxable income, which is calculated as the sum of earnings and interest income minus the greater of (i) mortgage payment x or (ii) the standard deduction s. That is:
Here the tax rate, or bracket, τ (·) is weakly increasing in taxable income.
Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries take in deposits, sell mortgages, and own the housing space rented by people. All intermediaries can borrow or lend funds in a world credit market at a given risk-free interest rater > 0. We will assume that there is one representative risk-neutral intermediary that takes all prices as given.
4 Decision Problems
People
The state variables for individuals are k, x, a, w and whether the individual is excluded from the mortgage market or not. Consider rst the decision problem of an individual who does not own housing and who is not excluded from the mortgage market due to prior default. For this person k = 0 and x = 0 and the person may choose to rent or she may choose to buy. Since the person is not excluded from the mortgage market she can borrow to purchase a house. In this case, if the individual chooses to purchase, she solves:
Consider next the decision problem of an individual who owns a house and has an outstanding mortgage.
The household may choose to keep the current house, sell it, or default on the mortgage. If she chooses to keep the house, she solves:
If she chooses to sell, she solves:
Here χ S is the cost of selling a house and is some percentage of the sale price of the house P (t). Selling the house requires the individual to buy back the perpetuity x at the risk-free interest rate. 1 If the household chooses to default on the mortgage, she solves:
Foreclosure results in the individual losing the house as well as the mortgage and being excluded from the mortgage market for some random length of time.
An individual who is a homeowner but excluded from the mortgage market can either keep her house or sell it. If she chooses to keep her house, she solves:
Ideally we should require the individual to buy back the perpetuity atq · x whereq is the price the individual paid when he issued the perpetuity. But implementing this would require expanding the state vector.
And for k > 0
For non-excluded households, let c(k, x, a, w, t), k (k, x, a, w, t), x (k, x, a, w, t), h(k, x, a, w, t), a(k, x, a, w, t)
and d(k, x, a, w, t) denote the optimal decision rules for consumption, size of owned housing, size of mortgage payments, housing services, nancial assets and default (d = 1 indicates default and d = 0 indicates no default). Also, let s(k, x, a, w, t) = 1 indicate the case where the individual sells the house, i.e., s(k, x, a, w, t) = 1
, a, w, t) and s X (k, 0, a, w, t) be the decisions of households that are excluded from the mortgage market.
Financial Intermediaries
The representative nancial intermediary accepts deposits, buys mortgages, and buys and rents housing.
We will assume that the intermediary chooses how much to engage in these activities on the basis of the expected return in each of these activities. Denote the intermediary's expected net rate return (prots) on a deposit of size a by π(a), the net expected return on a mortgage with characteristics k , x , y, w and t by π(k , x , y, w, t) and the net expected return on the purchase of h units of housing in period t by π(h, t).
Correspondingly, let m(a), m(k , x , y, w, t) and m(h, t) denote the measure (more precisely, the density or pdf ) of such contracts acquired by the nancial intermediary. Then, the nancial intermediary's decision problem is:
For there to be a (bounded) solution to this problem the net expected returns on each type of asset must be non-positive. For deposits this requires π(a) = a − [a(1 + r)]/(1 +r) ≤ 0 for all a. This requirement reduces
For housing, this requires that π(h, t) = R(t) · h + [P (t + 1)
intermediaries do not pay any cost for selling houses), where δ is the depreciation on rental properties. This requirement reduces to
For mortgages, the expression for net return is more involved. When the intermediary acquires a mortgage it gives up q(k , x, y, w, t) · x in goods. Next period, if the individual defaults, the intermediary receives
is the cost of foreclosure to the intermediary; if the individual sells the property, the intermediary receives x·(1+1/r); and if she neither defaults nor sells, the intermediary receives
x plus the value of the continuing mortgage, which is then given by q(k , x, a(k , x, y, w , t + 1), w , t + 1) · x.
Recalling the denition of d(k, x, a, w, t) and s(k, x, a, w, t), the requirement that the expected net return from a mortgage π(k , x , y, w, t) be non-positive becomes
An equilibrium consists of a sequence of rental pricing function {R * (t)}, a sequence of housing price functions {P * (t)}, a deposit interest rate r * , a sequence of mortgage price functions {q * (k, x, a, w, t)}, a sequence of distributions µ * (k, x, a, w, t) of people over the state space, and a sequence of decision rules for excluded and non-excluded individuals such that:
1. The decision rules are optimal given r * , R * (t), P * (t), q * (t).
2. The net returns (4)-(6) are zero.
3. Demand for housing equals supply, that is,
4. The sequence of distributions µ * (k, x, a, w, t) is implied by the decision rules.
Parameter Selection and Calibration
Turning rst to the Markov process for earnings, we assume that log earnings follow an AR1 process:
ln(w t ) = ρ ln(w t−1 ) + t
Several studies have estimated this process for the US using PSID earnings data. Estimates of ρ and the standard deviation of (σ ) vary across studies. We follow Jeske and Krueger (2005) and set ρ = 0.95 and σ = 0.129. This AR1 process is then approximated by a 5-state Markov chain.
Setting aside the parameters of the income tax schedule, our model economy has 11 other parameters.
These include 4 preference parameters (β, θ, γ, ν), 3 parameters related to housing transactions (χ S , χ B , δ), household income in 1998. We chose to target averages over the period 1993-2003 so as not to distort our parameter choices by booms and busts in the residential real estate markets. These targets are displayed in Table 1 . We use the average of these two numbers, which is $32, 931, as the median income of an individual ling for taxes. Normalizing the tax brackets for 1998 by this estimate of median income, we obtain the following tax schedule τ (·): 
It is useful to discuss some of the more salient features of the steady state. First, one may ask, why do people in our model have an incentive to purchase homes? In our calibration, we have assumed that there is no direct benet to homeownership (ν = 0) and the rental externality (the fact that rental properties depreciate but owner-occupied units do not) is negligible (δ = .002). Furthermore, in computing the solution to our model, we assume that households that rent can choose their h freely, while those that purchase their homes must choose from a nite set of house sizes, i.e., a from a nite set of k (and, therefore, h)
values. Thus, homeownership aords no direct utility benet, involves somewhat less exibility (in terms of house sizes) than renting, and involves the payment of signicant transactions costs in its acquisition.
Nevertheless, the majority of people choose to purchase their homes. This is because of the tax benet of homeownership: the implicit rental income from ownership is not counted as part of income and therefore not taxed. This exemption means that people especially those in the higher tax brackets have a strong incentive to purchase their homes. The deductibility of mortgage interest payments merely encourages these households to borrow to nance the purchase of their homes as opposed to paying for the purchase from accumulated assets.
Second, one may ask, why are there foreclosures in the steady state at all? In the steady state the value of a house does not change over time, and if the house was purchased with some down payment, the owner can recover his or her home equity by selling the house. So, why default? Two conditions must be satised.
First, it must be the case that the owner's home equity is less than the transactions costs of selling the house; otherwise selling will always dominate default. Formally, the condition is
where p * is the steady-state price of a unit of housing space. In the steady state, 36 percent of homeowners satisfy this condition. But this condition is not sucient. It must also be the case that the punishment from default is low. Recall that the punishment for default is exclusion from the mortgage market for several years. This punishment is ineective for an individual whose current and future income is expected to be low, as such a person does not gain from homeownership and would prefer to rent anyway. Therefore, for default to happen the homeowner must have low home equity and low income. Since homeowners tend to be relatively high earners, the probability of default on a mortgage is pretty low because earnings are a persistent process and it is unlikely that a homeowner would get an income shock bad enough to make him want to default.
The third salient feature of our model is that homeowners choose their down payment and this choice is regulated by the interest rate on the resulting loan. As noted above, a low down payment is a pre-condition for default, and therefore, the implicit interest rate on such loans will reect the probability of default. A borrower can lower the cost of the mortgage by lowering his or her promised payments x without changing the value of k, which is equivalent to putting down a higher down payment since the down payment is simply p * k − q(k, x, y, w)x and the term q(k, x, y, w)x is generally increasing in x. In the steady state, the average ratio of q(k, x, y, w)x to p * k (the loan-to-price ratio) is 0.9127. So, the average down payment is little under Finally, our model is consistent with the observation that owner-occupants consume more housing space, on average, than renters. In our equilibrium the per capita housing space of renters is 54 percent of per capita housing space of owner occupants. There are two reasons for this. First, because high earners choose to buy houses, the housing space of owner-occupants will be greater than that of renters. In addition, the tax benet of owner-occupancy makes owner-occupants consume more housing than renters; i.e., if an owneroccupant were to rent, he or she would rent less space. In the steady steady, if homeowners were to rent, their demand for space would be lower by 12 percent. This fact will play an important role in generating a mortgage crisis in our model.
The Mortgage Crisis
We model the mortgage crisis as stemming from an unexpected increase in the stock of housing. In particular,
we assume that the economy (city) enters the initial period, period 0, in the steady state corresponding to some housing stockH . Then, unexpectedly, the housing stock in period 1 rises to (1 + φ)H, φ > 0, and stays at that level forever. We assume that the new supply of housing, φH, shows up as an additional endowment in the hands of the nancial intermediary sector/business sector. Our analysis will focus on what happens in steady state as as a result of this increase and what happens along the transition to the new steady state.
We conduct our analysis under the assumption that φ = 0.05. This might seem high if our reference point is the whole economy.
6 But by all accounts the housing bubble aected some parts of the country more than others. Thus, the areas that have seen the most foreclosures and the steepest drop in housing prices presumably experienced more overbuilding than the economy as a whole. These changes accord with intuition. The (consumption good) price of housing space must decline in order for the economy to absorb the additional supply of housing. A lower price of housing, in turn, encourages more buying and selling because transactions costs (as a percentage of earnings) decline with the decline in the price of housing. To understand why the foreclosure rate and the loan-to-price ratio decline consider, again, the necessary condition for default, namely, the condition in (8) . Observe that for a mortgage for which this condition holds, a proportionate decline in both p * and x will cause the dierence to become a smaller negative number. In other words, the loss in wealth involved in selling the house as opposed to defaulting on it would be smaller. All else remaining the same, this decline in the real cost of selling will lower the probability of default and the cost of the mortgage. Individuals respond to this decline in the cost of borrowing by increasing x (borrowing more) and this accounts for the increase in the loan-to-price ratio.
Evidently, however, borrowers (home purchasers) do not increase x to completely neutralize the decrease in the probability of default so that, in equilibrium, there is a small decline in the foreclosure rate as well.
Compared to these long-run (steady-state) changes in the housing market, the on-impact eects (i.e., the eects in the period of the period of the shock) of the increase in housing supply are dramatically dierent. Observe that on impact (i.e., in period 1) the price of housing declines by 11 percent and the foreclosure rate spikes up to almost 21 percent. Correspondingly, the homeownership rate drops to 52 percent and there is a complete cessation of selling activity. Renters continue to purchase homes but the rate of buying on their part drops as well. Indeed, the total measure of individuals participating in the housing market, either as sellers or as buyers, drops by 37.18 percent. The only statistic that is not very dierent from its steady-state value is the loan-to-price ratio, which stays close to 90 percent. Figure 1 displays what happens to the rate of foreclosures (the red dashed line) and the price of housing after the initial period. The foreclosure rate falls back to around 4 percent and then declines monotonically toward its new steady-state value. The price of housing rises monotonically toward its new steady-state value as well. In both cases, the rise is very gradual and convergence takes many years.
What explains these results? In the long run, both owner-occupants and renters must increase their consumption of housing space so as to absorb the increased supply of housing. Indeed, in the new steady state the per capita consumption of housing space of both renters and owner-occupants goes up by 4 percent. But the adjustment by owner-occupants is slowed down by the transactions costs of selling and buying a house.
Thus, in the aftermath of the shock, the burden of adjustment falls disproportionately on the rental market and rents decline below their new steady-state value. The decline in rents causes the price of housing space to decline, since rents and prices must satisfy (5) with equality: if prices do not fall but rents do, the business sector would have an incentive to sell the property it owns, since holding on to it and renting it out would be less remunerative.
The decline in price, in turn, causes the necessary condition for default, condition (8) , to hold for a greater number of borrowers. In fact, the condition holds for 99 percent of the homeowners. So, the decline in price sets the precondition for foreclosure. But why do borrowers choose to default? In the steady state the trigger for default is a fall in income, which makes servicing the mortgage payments relatively onerous. But that is not the motivation for default at the start of the crisis. In the period of the shock, borrowers default because they wish to take advantage of the low rental price of housing space: defaulters give up the tax benets of homeownership in favor of the gain from consuming housing space at a (much) reduced rent. In subsequent periods, the trigger for defaults reverts to bad income shocks.
But exit from homeownership via foreclosure makes achieving equilibrium in the housing market more difcult. The reason was alluded to at the end of the previous section: all else remaining the same, a renter desires less housing space than an owner-occupant. Thus, as the ranks of owner-occupants shrink there is a tendency for the demand for housing space to shrink as well. Consequently, rents have to fall further to equate demand with supply. Of course, this in turn causes further declines in price, which induces more foreclosures. The sharp on-impact eects on price and foreclosures is the result of this circular dynamic. shock, the ranks of renters are swelled with defaulters and defaulters (or sellers, for that matter) cannot purchase homes rightaway. In the period following the shock, there is a spike in the percentage of renters purchasing homes; this comes from defaulters who are lucky enough to be let back into the housing market.
But the percentage of defaulters moving into homeownership declines over time as the measure of defaulters in the renter pool declines over time. Renters who are not defaulters do not normally wish to purchase homes because they are low earners. These people could be tempted to purchase homes in the expectation of capital gains, but the rise in price is too gradual for that to be protable.
Why is the rise in price so gradual? Following the period of the shock, the spike in new buyers is roughly oset by new defaulters. Thus, the percentage of homeowners in period 2 is only slightly larger than in period 1. Because the foreclosure rate stays elevated for many years into the future, there is a continuing partial oset to the measure of new buyers coming into the housing market. The net result of these dynamics is that the homeownership rate rises back to its new steady state level very gradually ( Figure 3 ). Because homeowners tend to occupy more space than renters (all else the same), the increase in the demand for housing space rises only gradually over time and, therefore, so does the price of housing.
Our assumption about the competitive pricing of loans has a bearing on the speed with which homeownership recovers after the shock. Our pricing equation (6) assumes that each loan is priced independently of any other loan -including loans that were made prior to the crisis and which suer from elevated rates of default after the shock. But we can also imagine a situation where these legacy loans -to borrow the term often used to refer to poorly performing assets in the current crisis -contaminate the pricing of new mortgages.
This will happen if new mortgages have to be made by existing nancial intermediaries who must use legacy loans (not new mortgages) as collateral for borrowed funds. Since legacy loans suer from much higher rates of default, the implicit interest rate at which the nancial intermediary can borrow will be much higher following the shock. This will make new mortgages more expensive and reduce the number of renters who move back into homeownership and thereby lead to an even more gradual increase in house price than shown in Figure 3 .
The Foreclosure Prevention Policy
This section analyzes the impact of the loan modication program implemented by the US government since March 2009. The key features of this policy are as follows. To be eligible for a loan modication, the mortgagor must have current income than his income at the time of the origination of the loan (the hardship requirement). Furthermore, the ratio of mortgage payments to income must be higher than 31 percent (there are some asset restrictions as well that we ignore). If a mortgage is eligible, the government promises to reimburse investors half the cost of reducing the mortgage payment-to-income ratio from 38 percent to 31 percent. The modication alters only the monthly payments; if the mortgagor were to sell the property, the outstanding loan amount has to be paid. Also, only one modication per mortgage is permitted (i.e., a modied mortgage cannot be modied again), and the modication ends in 6 years after which the mortgage payment is gradually raised back to the orginal amount. The option to modify an eligible mortgage is available for only 4 years.
To map this policy into our model we simplify matters somewhat. First, we assume that the percentages 31
and 38 apply to earnings as opposed to income. Since earnings are exogenous in our model this simplication reduces the computational burden signicantly. Dene x m (w) = 0.31w and let xm(w) = 0.38w. Then, on a modied mortgage with original payment x and current earnings w, the intermediary receives
and the mortgagor pays x m (w). The dierence is made up by the government. In the event the mortgagor sells the property, he must repay x/(1 + 1/r) to the intermediary. Thus, there is no loan forgiveness. 7 . We assume that the modication program is oered in the period of the shock only (i.e., in period 1 only) and 7 The policy permits forgiveness of interest but this is an option, not a requirement for modication that each agreed-to modication ends in 5 years. Under these rules, the period t = 1, 2, . . . , 5 market value of a mortgage with modied payment x m and original payment x is given by the recursion Since x m < x for an eligible mortgage, the mortgager will always prefer a modication. But for a modication to actually happen, the lender (intermediary) must not be worse o. Thus an eligible mortgage will be modied if and only if
Finally, we assume that borrowers currently in the highest earnings state are the only ones ineligible for a loan modication. These people have the same or higher earnings compared to the period in which they took out the loan and therefore fail the hardship test. Borrowers below the top earnings state may fail the hardship test as well, but we take these borrowers to be eligible for the program. It turns out that enlarging the scope of the program in this way does not aect the results because the mortgages that do ultimately get modied are almost always the ones that pass the hardship test as well. Figure 4 displays the foreclosure path with and without the policy in place (in all ensuing gures with the exception of Figure 6 , the (red) dotted line corresponds to the path under intervention and the (black) solid line the path under no intervention). The policy is quite eective in reducing foreclosures, but only temporarily so. In the period of the shock the foreclosure rate rises to a little over 9 percent, which is less than half of the spike in foreclosures in the absence of the policy.
8 The foreclosure rate remains below the non-interventionist rate for as long as the modications remain eective (year 6 in the Figure) .
Once the modications expire, there is a second spike in the foreclosure rate of more than 8 percent, and the foreclosure rate remains higher than the non-interventionist path for quite some time. The rates with and without intervention converge around 25 years in the future.
What explains this pattern? As noted earlier, the main motivation for foreclosures in the period of the shock is to take advantage of the low price of rental housing space. This incentive is blunted if the homeowner can reduce his or her mortgage payment which is exactly what the loan modication program does.
Consequently, as long as the homeowner can continue to live in the house with lowered payments and does not receive an adverse income shock, he or she does not wish to default. This lowers the foreclosure rate for as long as the modication is in place. Once the modication expires, the incentive to take advantage of the low price of housing space re-emerges and the foreclosure rate spikes up. Figure 5 displays the path of prices under the two scenarios. There is less of a decline in prices in the period of the shock and prices actually recover some during periods 2 − 6. Then there is a crash in period 7. Following the second crash, there is a gradual recovery in prices.
In this discussion, we have simplied matters by assuming that the modications expire at the end of 6 years. In reality, the plan is for the modications to be taken away gradually. The gradualness may make the second rise in foreclosures less sharp, but it is unlikely to completely eliminate it. The temporary nature of foreclosure relief suggests looking at the eects of policy from a cumulative perspective. Are there fewer total foreclosures as a result of the intervention? Figure 7 shows the cumulative path of foreclosures.
Evidently, the policy reduces total foreclosures for about 20 years out but then leads to slightly higher total foreclosures in the very long run.
Conclusions
We developed a quantitative equilibrium model of the housing market in which an unanticipated increase in the supply of housing depresses house prices and triggers default on mortgages. The decline in house prices creates an incentive to increase the consumption of housing space but leverage makes it costly for homeowners to sell their homes and buy bigger ones (they must absorb large capital losses). Instead, leveraged households nd it advantageous to default and rent housing space. Since renters demand less housing space than homeowners (homeowners demand more space because of the tax benets of owneroccupancy), foreclosures depress housing prices even further. Thus, our model features a circular dynamic that contributes to a downward spiral of higher foreclosures and lower house prices.
Because foreclosures contribute to lower house prices, a foreclosure prevention policy can potentially stabilize house prices. To explore this possibility we implement a somewhat simplied version of the government's foreclosure prevention policy in our model. We nd that the policy is indeed quite eective in reducing foreclosures and stabilizing house prices in the model. However, we also nd that these eects are temporary in that once the program expires in 6 years, foreclosures spike and housing prices crash again.
